

APPEAL NO. 031274
FILED JUNE 26, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A consolidated contested case hearing (CCH) was held on April 9, 2003. The hearing officer combined issues concerning two dates of injury at the CCH. In regard to date of injury of (subsequent injury), the issue was whether the appellant's (claimant herein) injury included an injury to her right shoulder. The parties stipulated at the CCH that it did not. In regard to date of injury of _____, the issues were whether the claimant suffered a compensable injury on that date and whether the claimant timely reported an injury on that date to the employer. The hearing officer decided that the claimant did not suffer a compensable injury on _____, and that she did not timely report such an injury to her employer. The claimant appeals contending that these determinations are contrary to the evidence and the respondent (carrier herein) replies that the hearing officer's decision was sufficiently supported by the evidence, even though there was conflicting evidence.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

A finding of injury may be based upon the testimony of the claimant alone. Gee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1989). However, as an interested party, the claimant's testimony only raises an issue of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Escamilla v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 499 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). In the present case the hearing officer found no injury, contrary to the testimony of the claimant. The claimant had the burden to prove she was injured in the course and scope of her employment. Reed v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We cannot say that the hearing officer was incorrect as a matter of law in finding that the claimant failed to meet this burden. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The 1989 Act generally requires that an injured employee or person acting on the employee's behalf notify the employer of the injury not later than 30 days after the injury occurred. Section 409.001. The burden is on the claimant to prove the existence of notice of injury. Travelers Insurance Company v. Miller, 390 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1965, no writ). In the present case, there was conflicting evidence as to whether or not the claimant gave timely notice of a _____, injury to her employer. It was the province of the hearing officer to resolve the conflicting evidence. Applying the standard of review discussed above, we cannot say the hearing officer erred in finding the claimant did not timely notify the employer of her alleged _____, injury.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **CLARENDON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**UNITED STATES CORPORATION COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.**

Gary L. Kilgore
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Chris Cowan
Appeals Judge

Thomas A. Knapp
Appeals Judge